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Abstract 
Forecasting Special Events such as conflicts and epidemics is challenging because of 
their very nature and the limited amount of historical information from which a reference base 
can be built. This study evaluates the performances of Structured Analogies, the Delphi method 
and Interaction Groups in forecasting the impact of such events. The empirical evidence reveals 
that the use of Structured Analogy leads to an average accuracy improvement of 8.4% in 
forecasting Special Events compared to Unaided Judgment. This improvement in accuracy is 
greater when the use of Structured Analogies is accompanied by an increase in the level of 
expertise, the use of more analogies, the relevance of these analogies, and the introduction of 
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pooling analogies through interaction with experts. Furthermore, the results from group 
Judgmental Forecasting approaches showed promising results; the Delphi method and Interaction 
Groups improved accuracy by 27% and 54.4%, respectively. 
 
Key words: Judgmental Forecasting, Structured Analogies, Delphi, Interaction Groups, 
Governmental Forecasting  
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1. Introduction 
Forecasting the timing and impact of Special Events such as natural catastrophes, conflicts, and 
even economic meltdowns like the 2008–2009 steep recession can be challenging because of the 
limited amount of historical information from which a reference base can be built. In this study, 
the performance of different methods of forecasting Special Events is evaluated by presenting 
empirical results for two real examples of policy implementation that pose typical Special Events 
because similar policies have rarely been implemented in the past. To forecast the impact of new 
policies, governments use Impact Assessments (IAs) and Cost-Benefit Analyses (CBAs). Both 
techniques are lengthy and costly processes that are typically outsourced and rarely contain any 
type of quantitative forecast of the impact of the introduced policy. Savio and Nikolopoulos 
(2013) propose a solution to this problem and suggest that forecasts should be prepared with 
simple Judgmental Forecasting methods before the employment of IAs or CBAs. Thus, although 
forecasting methods are not an alternative to IAs and CBAs, they might be used as a simple 
screening tool to indicate which policy implementations should be tested further with the 
complex and more expensive IA and/or CBA methods.  
     Although the empirical evidence in this study was derived from a governmental decision-
making context, the results may be generalized and applied to a variety of business situations in 
which the proposed forecasting methods might be used to successfully forecast projects, 
investments or even more regular events, such as marketing communications. In essence, the 
literature that favors the use of simple methods to forecast with information (Nikolopoulos, 
Goodwin, Patelis, & Assimakopoulos, 2007) was corroborated. 
     The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature on 
policy implementation and forecasting. Section 3 explains the methodological approach 
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employed in selecting the cases, methods, and evaluation metrics, as well as in choosing the 
experts and deciding their level of expertise. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 
discusses the findings. Finally, the last section offers concluding remarks and roadmaps for 
future research. 
 
2. Background Literature 
The application of the simplicity principle to theories is sometimes defended as an application of 
Occam's Razor, that is, “accept the simplest theory that works” (Simon, 1979). Zellner (2007), a 
leading economist, believed that complicated problems could be solved by the application of a 
few powerful, simplifying concepts, which he called "sophisticated simplicity". These powerful 
and simplifying concepts have been implemented in a myriad of industries and services. 
Simplicity also plays an integral role in shaping decision-making heuristics. Gigerenzer (1996) 
argues that biases that stem from heuristics can be eliminated by utilizing particular methods in a 
suitable context. 
 
2.1 Policy Implementation  
In governmental decision-making, finding simple tools that generate the same quality results as 
more complex tools is sometimes difficult. Additionally, the fact that public expenditures are 
involved makes decision makers less inclined to use methods that might seem simplistic in the 
eyes of the watchdog. 
     Impact Assessment (IA) is an aid to political decision making that aims to identify and assess 
the effectiveness of policies and objectives pursued (European Commission, 2009). IA consists 
of a set of logical steps leading toward the formulation and preparation of proposals through a 
4 
 
 
 
balanced appraisal of political impact. Moreover, policies concerned with new technologies and 
innovations are often assessed with their adoption and diffusion rates, which are typically 
measured in terms of the proportion of agents using the new technique compared to those using 
older techniques (Askarany, 2006).  
     The main goal of modern paradigms of public administration, such as Public Value 
Management, is to enhance public values through forces that do not rely solely on traditional 
reformative norms (Stoker, 2006). Thus, Public Value Management emphasizes the feasibility 
and value creation of individual actions. The core idea of adding value to the public domain by 
ensuring that policy objectives are met while improving the efficiency of the public policy 
process is consistent with the fundamental notion of this research (Pitts, 2007; Talbot, 2009). 
Public Value Management would effectively require any government to base its decisions on a 
priori forecasts of policy effectiveness, which is defined as the extent of change in the current 
situation in the direction of the policy target. Ex-ante evaluations of policy effectiveness 
typically involve a mixture of Impact Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis.   
     IA may be performed by using a variety of different models (European Commission, 2009). 
The selection of a particular model is dependent on the availability of data in each particular case 
(De Gooijer & Hyndman, 2006; Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2009); IA is considered a rather costly 
and resource-extensive tool (Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2010, 2013).   
     Although CBA is a useful tool, it is limited because it only evaluates policies in terms of 
economic efficiency (Maas, 1966; Simpson & Walker, 1987). Both IA and CBA are tools that 
can be used after a specific policy implementation has been decided upon (Savio & 
Nikolopoulos, 2013). As a result, they are not used in the preliminary screening of alternative 
policy implementations, which leads to the space for simple and fast forecasting approaches that 
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estimate the effectiveness of policies that may be implemented. Consequently, those forecasts 
might be used to select which alternative to implement, and then IA or CBA would be employed. 
 
2.2 Forecasting 
The standard benchmark of the Judgmental Forecasting approach is Unaided Judgment (Green & 
Armstrong, 2007a) in which individuals are not given guidance as to proper forecasting 
procedures. The unstructured employment of panels of experts (Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2010) 
has several limitations (Lee, Goodwin, Fildes, Nikolopoulos, & Lawrence, 2007), such as the 
inability of forecasters to recall analogous cases and the recollection of unusual or inappropriate 
past cases. Thus, the adoption of structured approaches is seen as a better way to overcome these 
limitations and fully capitalize on expert judgment (Green & Armstrong, 2007b). 
     The Delphi method (Rowe & Wright, 2001) is a multiple-round survey in which experts 
participate anonymously and provide their forecasts and feedback. At the end of each round, 
participants receive a report, including descriptive statistics of the forecasts provided. The Delphi 
method is completed after a predefined number of rounds or whenever a desired consensus level 
is reached. Generally, four key features tend to define a ‘Delphi’ a group procedure – anonymity, 
iteration, controlled feedback, and the statistical aggregation and presentation of group 
responses. Conversely, the Interaction Groups method suggests active interaction with a group of 
experts until a consensus forecast is reached through debate and discussion. A key driver in this 
method’s success is the pooling of information. However, potential problems arise from group 
biases introduced by the face–to-face contact of the experts, such as the ‘central tendency’ and 
the ‘dominant personalities’ effects (Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971). Evidence of the forecasting 
potential of Interaction Groups is not consistent (Armstrong, 2006; Boje & Murnighan, 1982; 
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Graefe & Armstrong, 2011). Moreover, group-based approaches incur extra costs resulting from 
multiple rounds in the Delphi setup or the need for meetings in the formulation of Interaction 
Groups. This fact renders these methods relatively more costly than other methods that group-
based approaches are competing against.  
 
3. Methodology 
The Special Events examined in this study are two policy implementations (PIS – a term 
introduced in Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2013) provided by an EU country’s Special Secretariat for 
Digital Planning, a governmental body that focuses on controlling budgets that aims to accelerate 
the use of IT. 
     The first policy (PIS A) was entitled “See Your Life Digitally” and aimed to promote the 
laptop purchases among undergraduate students in universities. The government was willing to 
provide a subsidy of up to 400€ for the purchase of a laptop computer. With the €400 incentive 
and the overall policy budget that was to be allocated, decision makers were interested to 
forecast the following: 
[PIS A - Q1]: What percentage of eligible students will buy a laptop? 
[PIS A - Q2]: How many weeks will it take for 50% of eligible students to participate in 
the scheme? 
     The second policy (PIS B) was entitled “Parents.eu” and aimed to train and certify parents of 
high school pupils in ‘Internet safety’. Parents had free online access to a distance-learning 
platform and free home tuition from instructors. Moreover, the policy budget funded a two-
month subscription to a broadband service chosen by the parents and covered the expenses and 
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fees for their certification exam. The policy makers in this instance were interested in obtaining 
forecasts for the following: 
[PIS B - Q1]: What percentage of eligible parents will receive training? 
[PIS B - Q2]: What percentage of eligible parents will receive certification? 
[PIS B - Q3]: What percentage of eligible parents will obtain broadband Internet access 
(using the funding provided by the policy scheme)? 
 
     Table 1 presents the actual results from the implementation of the two policies, and these 
outcomes will be used to evaluate the accuracy of the forecasts. 
Table 1 here. 
 
     It must be emphasized that the Special Secretariat did not produce advance forecasts for the 
effectiveness of the proposed policies. In fact, the incentives (400€ in the first policy and the 
funded services in the second) were ad-hoc decisions. The lack of forecasts might sound 
irrational prima-facie, but it is common practice in such projects for the following reasons: 
 Lack of in-house resources to produce forecasts, so forecasting would have to have been 
outsourced to a consultancy firm, which would have meant costs and delays for the 
secretariat. Furthermore, the cost of obtaining external forecasts for such a small-scale 
EU project would be inappropriate. 
 In such projects, delays create problems because of the way EU funds are allocated. 
Although the funds are secure in principle and provided from the EU to member states to 
run investment and development projects, delays in completing projects can lead to the 
cessation of funding. 
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3.1 Experts 
As no similar policy schemes had been implemented in the past, no quantitative data were 
available. Thus, experts were used to provide judgmental forecasts. The participants were chosen 
based on their expertise in one or more of the following areas:  
 Digital Planning policies; 
 Forecasting; and 
 Information Technology. 
     A list of 300 experts was formed with the assistance of the Special Secretariat. All experts 
were initially contacted via email, in which a brief description of the forecasting exercise and a 
formal invitation to take part in the study were provided. The invitation came directly from the 
Special Secretariat of Digital Planning of the Ministry of Economics and Finance to assure 
potential participants of the importance of this operation. In total, 55 experts responded 
positively to the call and participated in the research. These experts were sourced from a wide 
variety of sectors, including academia, industry, financial services and consultancy firms. 
     No monetary or in-kind incentives were provided to any participant for taking part in the 
experiment except for the personal invitation from the Secretariat. All participants were provided 
with full descriptions of the two policies and the entire procedure was administered remotely 
through email.  
 
3.2 Methods 
Four methods have been evaluated in this study; the first – Unaided Judgment – is the 
benchmark. Experts were instructed to provide point forecasts and 90% prediction intervals. A 
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full calendar week was given to return their forecasts via email. The methods that were deployed 
included the following: 
     Group A - (20 experts), Unaided Judgment (UJ): This method is a simple and quite 
popular Judgmental Forecasting approach. Experts are given no guidance except for a general 
description of the intended policies. 
     Group B - (20 experts), semi-Structured Analogies (s-SA): The Structured Analogies 
approach was proposed by Green and Armstrong (2007b) and is based on forecasting by analogy 
by exploiting the similarities of past events or experiences. These past events/situations have the 
same or similar characteristics as the problem to be forecasted and can be used as templates. 
These types of mental templates are the analogies. The experts are first asked to recall as many 
analogies as possible. Subsequently, they produce a quantitative similarity rating between each 
analogy and the problem to be forecasted and state the outcome of that analogy. The 
administrator uses the experts’ data to produce a final forecast. In this study, a slightly simpler 
version of the method, called semi-Structured Analogies (s-SA, Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2013) 
was implemented. In this approach, similarity ratings and outcomes are not used by the 
administrator to generate forecasts because the final forecasts are produced by the experts. 
     Group C - (10 experts), Delphi (D): This approach is a popular group Judgmental 
Forecasting method that includes multiple rounds of questionnaires administered to a group of 
experts. Although several variations of the method exist (Rowe & Wright, 1999, 2001), only two 
rounds were run in the current implementation to limit the process to two weeks (and to avoid 
having experts drop out). In the first round, the experts forecasted with Unaided Judgment. Once 
the forecasts were collected, feedback was provided to the group in the form of an average 
forecast for the group, in addition to the maximum and minimum forecasts and the justifications 
10 
 
 
 
for those extreme forecasts (in a short memo). In the second round, the participants could revise 
their forecasts in light of the initial feedback. The average of the second round of forecasts was 
used as the group forecast.  
     Group D - (5 experts), Interaction Group (IG): This group met in a restaurant, and the 
entire process was supervised by an experienced facilitator. The meeting lasted three hours and 
was recorded. The first hour was spent with introductions and a light dinner. In the next two 
hours, the group forecasting exercise occurred, in which the experts were first given the 
questionnaires, then encouraged to recall analogies and their corresponding outcomes, and then 
to rate those analogies in terms of similarity. Finally, the experts were asked to select the most 
appropriate analogies to produce point forecasts as well as 90% prediction intervals. This process 
was first performed individually and was then followed by the group interaction in which experts 
repeated the process aloud and exchanged their information until a consensus group forecast was 
reached. 
 
3.3 Participants’ Expertise 
The participants’ expertise was rated based on the following three specific questions: 
[EXP - Q1]: How would you rate your expertise (out of 10) in policy forecasting? 
[EXP - Q2]: How many years of experience do you have in the ICT market? 
[EXP - Q3]: How many years of experience do you have in policy making for the ICT 
market? 
     Based on the normalized responses to the above three questions, an index was created. 
Subsequently, according to the scores from that index, experts were assigned to two groups (low 
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expertise and high expertise). Table 2 demonstrates how the experts were allocated to each 
group.  
Table 2 here. 
 
3.4 Measuring Performance 
Forecasting accuracy was measured through an absolute metric (Mean Absolute Error, or MAE) 
and a relative metric (Relative Absolute Error, or RAE) as the ratio of the MAE of interest to the 
MAE of UJ-low-expertise. Whenever RAE<1, the treatment is an improvement over the 
benchmark. 
     Finally, for the overall comparison between all methods and all questions, Mean Absolute 
Percentage Errors (MAPE) was also calculated.  
 
4. Results  
For the five questions presented in 3.1 (with the realized outcomes listed in Table 1), all errors 
for the experts’ forecasts were calculated. For each of the methods and questions, the MAE, the 
RAE, the percentage frequency with which the forecasts fall within the experts’ prediction 
intervals, and the standard deviation of the errors were calculated. Moreover, all results were 
broken down according to the level of participants’ expertise. Four forecasts are given in the 
form of percentages (%) because these are essentially ‘take-up rates’, whereas one is given in 
weeks (PIS A - Q2). The results for each method will be presented separately; at the end of the 
section, a cross-comparison will be conducted and the results will be discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
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4.1 Unaided Judgment 
The results for UJ (Group A) are presented in Table 3. First, experts with high level of expertise 
produced the best forecasts in almost all cases. Second, this group seemed to be rather uncertain 
about the submitted forecasts as evidenced by the low accuracy for the prediction intervals (38%, 
on average).  
Table 3 here. 
 
4.2 Semi-Structured Analogies 
The results for s-SA are presented in Table 4. Participants with low expertise produced worse 
forecasts in three out of the five questions. Low-expertise participants were more accurate in four 
out of the five questions, as far as prediction intervals are concerned. Notably, the standard 
deviation is lower for all responses provided by high-expertise participants.  
Table 4 here. 
     Many experts recalled one to two analogies per policy, whereas others provided no analogies 
at all. Table 5 presents the average number of analogies recalled and the respective mean 
similarity rating. The latter rating measures the similarity between the recalled analogies and the 
case under consideration; the score is judgmentally assigned by participants for each of the 
recalled analogies. Overall, one analogy was produced on average and the mean similarity rating 
was medium to high (7/10). Notably, the number of analogies recalled and the similarity ratings 
increased for PIS B  as the level of expertise increases. Figures 1 and 2 present the accuracy 
(measured by MAPE) with respect to the number of analogies recalled and the similarity ratings. 
When experts provided two or three analogies, the accuracy seemed to increase. Furthermore, 
experts who provided analogies with high similarity ratings had better accuracy on average than 
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those who provided no analogies at all or who produced analogies with average similarity 
ratings.  
Table 5 here. 
Figure 1 here. 
Figure 2 here. 
 
4.3 The Delphi Method(D) 
Table 6 presents the performance of each round of the Delphi method (Group C). The first 
notable result is that both forecasting errors and standard deviation are lower in the second 
round. As a result, the Delphi method achieved a higher level of consensus across the group 
through its iterative nature that was coupled with improved accuracy. The first round of Delphi 
forecasts were produced with UJ; comparing the first round of Delphi (Table 6) and UJ (Table 3) 
shows that Group C produces better forecasts for four questions and higher accuracy rates of 
prediction intervals (54%, on average).  
Table 6 here. 
 
4.4 Interaction Group (IG) 
Table 7 presents the results for the IG. The group forecast is compared to the average of the 
individual forecasts of the same experts. The face-to-face interaction of IG appears to have led 
the experts to produce more accurate forecasts for four out of the five questions. The accuracy 
improvement for certain questions was remarkable (e.g., PIS B – Q1). The prediction intervals 
were also more accurate. The experts used s-SA to produce their individual forecasts; when they 
used the same method to produce a group forecast, the number and similarity of the recalled 
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analogies increased, as shown in Table 8 because a larger pool of analogies was used when the 
experts were sharing information. In addition, it must be noted that all five participants have high 
levels of expertise in the field, as shown in Table 2, which may be responsible for some of the 
success of this group.  
Table 7 here. 
Table 8 here. 
 
4.5 Methods Comparison 
The group forecasting techniques provided the most accurate forecasts. Quantifying the achieved 
improvement, a relative improvement of 8.4% is observed when using Structured Analogies, 
27% when using Delphi and 54.4% for the Interaction Group.  
Table 9 here. 
 
     IG is the most accurate method in four out of the five questions, whereas the D performs best 
in the remaining one question. Across all five questions in total (the last two rows in Table 9), IG 
is the best method, followed by the D and then s-SA.  
 
5. Discussion 
The empirical findings of this study illustrate that group-forecasting techniques provide the most 
accurate forecasts. To elaborate more on this, groups A and B (in which experts worked by 
themselves) were pooled together and compared to groups C and D (in which experts worked 
within groups). The results are shown in Table 10, which illustrates an improvement across the 
five questions (both in terms of the average and the geometric mean) when experts work in 
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groups (Mean RAE 0.60 vs. 0.86) and even more improvement if they are actually interacting 
with each other (Mean RAE 0.36).  
Table 10 here. 
     The next question was to investigate if structuring the way experts elicited their forecasts 
provided better results. Thus, groups A and C (the first round only where experts used UJ) were 
pooled together and their results were compared to groups B and D. The results are shown in 
Table 11, which reveals an improvement across the five questions (both in terms of the average 
and the geometric mean) if a structuring approach is used (Mean RAE 0.75 vs. 0.81). 
Table 11 here. 
     As far as the level of expertise is concerned, the empirical results indicate that an increased 
level of expertise had a positive impact on accuracy. Moreover, the number of analogies 
provided and the greater similarity rates seem to have a smaller impact on individuals' accuracy 
when the s-SA approach is used.  
     One of the study’s contributions comes from the performance of the IG. Pooling analogies 
through open-dialogue in which experts exchange opinions and experiences provided very good 
forecasts; conversely, in the Delphi method, only descriptive statistics and limited reasoning are 
disseminated at the end of each round, as no exchange of analogies has taken place. The IG 
included experts with diverse professional backgrounds and this may have contributed in the 
success of this group because experts from a wide range of fields have been able to better 
identify good analogies by drawing on a wider pool of experience and knowledge.  
     Social facilitation theory claims that people tend to achieve better results in a task they master 
when they work with other people (Zanjonc, 1965). Zanjonc argues that even the mere presence 
of others can make people work harder and achieve better outcomes. Cottrell (1972) posits that 
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agents tend to increase their efforts because of competition or in the presence of evaluation 
procedures. Williams, Harkins, and Letane (1981) argue that anonymity has an important 
influence in an individual's output in a group; when anonymity is eliminated, social loafing is 
reduced. Harkins (1987) addresses that identifying and evaluating an agent’s output can drive 
motivation. The Interaction Groups enhanced social facilitation, reduced free riding (social 
loafing) and enabled the group to achieve good results. The escalation rate of accuracy is greater 
when high-expertise groups tend to work under stimulating conditions compared to low-
expertise groups. This reason was one of the drivers to use only high-expertise experts in this 
judgmentally sampled group. However, the process may take longer because of the 
‘overconfidence’ and ‘glossing over’ effects that affect the cognitive energy (Alexander, 2003; 
Chi, 1978, 2006) of experts with higher expertise who must mobilize their systems to solve 
problems that might require extra effort, according to Kahneman (2011).  
     It is notable that this study’s results are based on small samples (ten experts for the D and five 
experts for the IG), with only one group forecast for each method per question; as only five 
questions in the study existed, hence, only five group forecasts and five errors for each method 
were measured. It is difficult to gather a sufficient number of experts in reality experiments, thus 
results that are presented without any statistical significance tests should not be discounted 
prima-facie. In addition, recent discussions in the forecasting literature advocate presenting 
results based on small samples even in the absence of any rigorous statistical testing (Armstrong, 
2007a,b; Goodwin, 2007). 
     To be more confident that empirical findings from the study can be generalized, sensitivity 
analysis of the results was conducted and presented in Tables 10 and 11 by employing a standard 
cross-validation approach. 10% of the samples were randomly excluded and the analysis was re-
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ran in Tables 10 and 11; if the ‘same’ results were found (‘same’ in the sense that the same 
method continues to perform better), then it can be claimed that the results have some level of 
robustness. In fact, this cross-validation experiment was repeated 10 times; in all cases, the same 
methods continued to prevail, and the confidence in the findings became stronger.  
     Finally, it is notable that the proposed simple Judgmental Forecasting methods cost very little; 
certainly, the cost is much less than the actual policy cost. It also costs much less than any 
alternative forecasting approach, in which those policies could only be parts of advanced 
forecasting methods within costly and time-consuming CBA or IA reports; and of course much 
less than the actual cost of CBA or IA. However, it must be stressed that the proposed methods 
are not alternatives to CBA and/or IA but occur at an earlier step in the lengthy policy 
formulation process. Nonetheless, this step is crucial because money can be saved by investing in 
CBA/IA only for the most promising policy implementations. To find the most promising 
policies, simple, reliable, and relatively inexpensive forecasts were required. It is better to make 
informed decisions based on forecasts instead of making ad-hoc decisions without forecasts, 
which was the actual case for the specific policies under investigation in this study (see section 
3.2). 
 
6. Conclusions and Further Research 
Forecasting Special Events is challenging. This study utilizes policy implementation, one of the 
most challenging Special Events to forecast, in which available historical information is limited 
and the forecasting horizon is long. The results presented here might be generalized and applied 
to any business or management situations. The results also corroborate the stream of forecasting 
research in the presence of information cues. Decision makers are expected to benefit by 
18 
 
 
 
adopting these simple Judgmental Forecasting methods. Nevertheless, further experiments 
should be conducted to improve estimates of effect size and knowledge of how conditions and 
variations in the methods affect their relative accuracy in different contexts.  
     The relative performances of four forecasting methods (Unaided Judgment, Structured 
Analogies, the Delphi method, and Interaction Groups) were evaluated for two different levels of 
expertise. Simple group techniques such as the Delphi method perform very well. Structured 
Analogies and Interaction Groups outperform the benchmark (Unaided Judgment) when:  
 the level of expertise rises; 
 more analogies are used; 
 more ‘relevant’ analogies are used; 
 pooling of analogies is facilitated (through interactions of experts); and 
 experts from a more diverse background are employed. 
     Indeed the findings suggest that overall actual forecasting improvement might be as high as 
54% when most of these conditions are met. These results are consistent with the previous body 
of literature; however, the exact effect size varies depending on the context of each study. 
     With the aforementioned results, it can be claimed that this study corroborates the existing 
body of evidence that supports the forecasting principles as maintained by J.S. Armstrong 
(2001a) at www.forprin.com and his respective book. In further detail, empirical evidence is 
provided in favor of the following source: www.forprin.com, “Armstrong_2001_Checklist –
form.doc” or “Standardshort.pdf”), Armstrong, J. S. (2001b). 
Principle 3.5: Obtain information from similar (analogous) series or cases. 
Principle 6.3: Use structured forecasting methods rather than unstructured. 
Principle 7.1: Keep methods simple. 
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Principle 8.3: Ask experts to justify their forecasts. 
Principle 8.5: Obtain forecasts from heterogeneous experts. 
Principle 12.2: Use many approaches (or forecasters), preferably at least five. 
Principle 13.25: Use multiple measures of accuracy. 
Principle 13.26: Use out-of-sample (ex ante) error measures. 
Principle 14.1: Estimate prediction intervals (PI). 
     The results presented herein are based on small-sized samples of experts, a fact that might be 
an impediment for generalizing the findings. However, a sensitivity analysis and a fair amount of 
argumentation were provided which gave more confidence that the findings can be generalized. 
Furthermore, if the context of this case study was take into account, and how public 
administration is actually organized in real life conditions, these results might provide valid 
insights into the performance of each method. Repetition in other case studies might help to 
prove the validity of the findings and provide a generalized output for the superiority of some 
these methods, especially the simpler ones, such as Structured Analogies. 
     Overall, satisfactory empirical evidence was presented to support the view that it is more 
beneficial for policy-makers to discontinue (or delay for a later stage) the use of more complex 
forecasting methods such as IA or CBA by taking into account the trade-offs of using forecasting 
techniques that are simple compared to those that are complex. By keeping things simple, policy 
makers are able to reduce the time and costs necessary for choosing policy strategies without 
major sacrifices in accuracy. 
     As far as the future of such studies is concerned, the proposed approaches could also be tested 
in different contexts to gather further evidence that would allow for the full generalization of the 
results. The application in different contexts, such as forecasting the sales of a new product or the 
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success of promotions in retail campaigns, would be an interesting facet of the relative 
performance of the methods to back up the findings and assign them extra validity and 
applicability, especially for the readership of this specific journal.  
     Moreover, an evaluation of other judgmental approaches, such as the Nominal Group 
Technique (Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971), might be explored (Graefe & Armstrong, 2011). In 
addition, sampling more experts would offer the opportunity to test more treatments, such as IGs 
with UJ versus IGs with s-SA or to test SA as it was originally designed by Green and 
Armstrong (2007b).  
     Finally, the option to offer incentives to the experts has not yet been tested, and this feature 
has provided strong insights into similar studies in the past. Certainly more avenues could be 
pursued in this research domain, and it is hoped that this study will provide interest for future 
investigations.  
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Table 1. Realized outcomes for the two Special Events. 
PIS Case Question Outcome 
PIS A - Q1 
Percentage of eligible students that eventually 
bought a portable computer.  
87.0% 
PIS A - Q2 
Number of weeks it took 50% of the eligible 
students to participate in the scheme. 
3.5 weeks 
PIS B - Q1 
Percentage of eligible parents that have 
eventually been trained. 
52.2% 
PIS B - Q2 
Percentage of eligible parents that eventually 
received certification. 
31.3% 
PIS B - Q3 
Percentage of eligible parents that obtained 
broadband Internet access using the funding 
provided by the scheme. 
15.0% 
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Table 2. Group of experts. 
Group A B C D 
Level of 
expertise 
UJ s-SA D IG  
Low 11 12 4 0 
High 9 8 6 5 
ALL 20 20 10 5 
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Table 3. Unaided Judgment (Group A). 
Q
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R
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S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 
P
IS
 A
 -
 Q
1
 Low 11.5% 1.00 54.5% 0.12 
High 8.3% 0.73 77.8% 0.09 
ALL 10.1% 0.88 65.0% 0.11 
P
IS
 A
 -
 Q
2
 Low 12.05 1.00 27.3% 12.46 
High 1.94 0.16 55.6% 2.57 
ALL 7.50 0.62 40.0% 10.87 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
1
 Low 23.7% 1.00 27.3% 0.26 
High 25.5% 1.07 33.3% 0.24 
ALL 24.5% 1.03 30.0% 0.25 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
2
 Low 20.8% 1.00 27.3% 0.23 
High 13.8% 0.66 33.3% 0.10 
ALL 17.6% 0.85 30.0% 0.20 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
3
 Low 23.2% 1.00 18.2% 0.24 
High 20.4% 0.88 33.3% 0.20 
ALL 21.9% 0.94 25.0% 0.23 
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Table 4. Semi-Structured Analogies (Group B). 
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P
IS
 A
 -
 Q
1
 Low 13.1% 1.14 66.7% 0.19 
High 10.1% 0.88 50.0% 0.12 
ALL 11.9% 1.04 60.0% 0.17 
P
IS
 A
 -
 Q
2
 Low 5.08 0.42 25.0% 6.68 
High 5.13 0.43 12.5% 4.92 
ALL 5.10 0.42 20.0% 6.04 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
1
 Low 22.8% 0.96 41.7% 0.23 
High 19.1% 0.80 37.5% 0.11 
ALL 21.3% 0.90 40.0% 0.19 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
2
 Low 15.5% 0.74 25.0% 0.18 
High 11.3% 0.54 75.0% 0.13 
ALL 13.8% 0.66 45.0% 0.17 
P
IS
 B
 -
 Q
3
 Low 26.4% 1.14 25.0% 0.28 
High 31.9% 1.37 0.0% 0.24 
ALL 28.6% 1.23 15.0% 0.27 
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Table 5. Analogies produced in s-SA per level of expertise. 
  s-SA 
P
IS
 
Level of 
Expertise 
Number of 
Analogies 
Mean Similarity 
Rate of Analogies 
P
IS
 A
 Low 0.75 7.2 
High 0.88 6.6 
P
IS
 B
 
Low 0.50 6.5 
High 1.13 7.0 
 
  
  
Table 6. The Delphi method (Group C). 
  1st Round 2nd Round 
Question Expertise MAE RAE 
Prediction 
Interval 
Accuracy 
Rate (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
MAE RAE 
Standard 
Deviation 
PIS A - Q1 
Low 2.5% 0.22 100.0% 0.03 2.5% 0.22 0.03 
High 8.3% 0.73 66.7% 0.10 6.7% 0.58 0.07 
ALL 6.0% 0.52 80.0% 0.08 5.0% 0.44 0.06 
PIS A - Q2 
Low 1.25 0.10 50.0% 1.12 1.25 0.10 1.12 
High 6.00 0.50 50.0% 7.65 5.67 0.47 5.72 
ALL 4.10 0.34 50.0% 6.42 3.90 0.32 5.00 
1 
 
 
 
PIS B - Q1 
Low 14.9% 0.63 75.0% 0.17 14.9% 0.63 0.17 
High 14.0% 0.59 66.7% 0.12 14.0% 0.59 0.12 
ALL 14.3% 0.60 70.0% 0.14 14.3% 0.60 0.14 
PIS B - Q2 
Low 16.3% 0.78 25.0% 0.17 16.3% 0.78 0.17 
High 18.4% 0.88 33.3% 0.27 7.9% 0.38 0.13 
ALL 17.5% 0.84 30.0% 0.24 11.2% 0.54 0.15 
PIS B - Q3 
Low 22.5% 0.97 25.0% 0.21 22.5% 0.97 0.21 
High 28.4% 1.22 50.0% 0.31 26.7% 1.15 0.19 
ALL 26.0% 1.12 40.0% 0.28 25.0% 1.08 0.20 
  
 
Table 7. IG group forecast vs. the average error of the individuals participating in this subgroup. 
 
IG 
Individuals participating 
in IG 
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n
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A
E
 
R
A
E
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te
rv
a
ls
 
A
cc
u
ra
cy
 R
a
te
  
PIS A - Q1 3.0% 0.26 100.0% 7.5% 0.66 40.0% 
PIS A - Q2 2.50 0.21 100.0% 4.00 0.33 0.0% 
PIS B - Q1 2.8% 0.12 100.0% 14.9% 0.63 60.0% 
PIS B - Q2 11.3% 0.54 100.0% 10.1% 0.48 60.0% 
PIS B – Q3 15.1% 0.65 0.0% 20.8% 0.90 0.0% 
 
 
Table 8. Analogies recalled in IG.  
 IG 
PIS 
Number of 
Analogies 
Mean Similarity 
Rate of Analogies 
PIS A 3 6.3 
PIS B 4 7.2 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
Table 9. Methods comparison (APE%). 
 UJ (%) s-SA (%) D (%) IG (%) 
PIS A - Q1 11.6 13.7 5.7 3.4* 
PIS A - Q2 214.3 145.7 111.4 71.4* 
PIS B - Q1 46.9 40.8 27.4 5.4* 
PIS B - Q2 56.2 44.1 35.8* 36.1 
PIS B - Q3 146.0 190.7 166.7 100.3* 
Mean MAPE 95.0 87.0 69.4 43.3* 
Relative improvement  
(to UJ) Benchmark 8.4 27.0 54.4 
* These numbers indicate the most accurate forecasts for the relevant questions 
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Table 10. Statistical accuracy of different treatments (RAE of individuals). 
 
No 
Grouping 
(40 experts) 
Delphi 
Group 
(10 experts) 
Interaction 
Group 
(5 experts) 
PIS A - Q1 0.96 0.44 0.26 
PIS A - Q2 0.52 0.32 0.21 
PIS B - Q1 0.96 0.60 0.12 
PIS B - Q2 0.76 0.54 0.54 
PIS B - Q3 1.09 1.08 0.65 
Mean RAE 0.86 0.60 0.36 
GM RAE 0.83 0.55 0.30 
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Table 11. Statistical accuracy of the different treatments (RAE of individuals). 
 
No 
Structured 
Approach 
(30 experts) 
Semi 
Structured 
Analogies 
(25 experts) 
PIS A - Q1 0.76 0.88 
PIS A - Q2 0.53 0.38 
PIS B - Q1 0.89 0.74 
PIS B - Q2 0.85 0.64 
PIS B - Q3 1.00 1.11 
Mean RAE 0.81 0.75 
GM RAE 0.79 0.71 
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Figure 1. Forecasting accuracy of s-SA vs. the number of analogies recalled. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Forecasting accuracy of s-SA vs. similarity of analogies. 
